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Abstract. This paper proposes an analytical framework, which we use to examine the implementation of 
the European Union’s policy on movable cultural heritage. We apply this framework to the case of 
transposition and implementation of the EU rules regarding movable cultural heritage in Bulgaria. We 
find different implementation outcomes stemming from one and the same formal policy. Due to high 
levels of polarization between political decision makers, the implementing actors have broad discretion to 
apply different informal policies. In depth analysis of implementation also suggests that under these 
conditions different implementing players have followed their normative orientations and applied 
completely different informal policies. Different implementing actors apply different policies and, thus, 
as it were, they live in parallel universes where different implementation practices exist. 
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1.  Introduction 
The actual implementation of EU policies is still understudied: a recent paper summarizing the findings 
of a database compiling qualitative studies of implementation found that only 19 per cent of all studies 
deal with implementation as opposed to formal transposition (Toshkov et al. 2010). Implementation is, 
however, the last and arguably best measure of how Europe hits home, how citizens experience policies 
that may have been conceived in Brussels and taken long time to become formally part of the domestic 
legislative framework. In this paper, we aim to bring our understanding of implementation further and 
broaden the scope of examined policy fields by offering a theoretically driven study of implementation in 
an area which is both understudied and closely connected to core internal market issues: the area of 
cultural heritage. 
 The European cultural heritage policy aims to protect important cultural goods of the member states. 
Although the common market allows for the free movement of goods, for some cultural goods export is 
only possible with a community license. The policy defines these cultural goods and guarantees their 
return within the EU the moment they have been unlawfully taken from the territory of a member state. 
The policy allows member states to adopt further, national constraints on the movement of cultural goods. 
Bulgaria adopted the EU policy measures over several years and does not appear to have problems with 
formal adoption. The domestic implementing authorities, however, reacted differently to the changes. 
While some adjusted their actual practice in line with the new legislation, others continue to work as 
before. This leads this to the empirical puzzle of the case which is why implementing were authorities 
able to maintain different practices and why legislative authorities did not force them to comply. 
 Scholars of implementation have long known that changes in legislative rules do not necessarily lead 
to changed policies and practices on the ground. In the context of the European Union (EU), 
implementation of rules adopted at European level starts with the formal transposition of directives, but 
real implementation, defined as changed policies and changed practices on the ground, is a different story. 
Brunsson and Olsen’s (1997) research on organizational reform has shown that organizations faced with 
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external reform demands can create two parallel sets of structures of formal and informal rules. At a 
second stage of implementation of reform, organizations sometimes isolate the changed rules and keep 
them only for symbolic compliance with external requirements, while in practice continuing to operate 
according to different informal rules. In the European Union context, Lang’s (2003) research of 
implementation of the EU’s structural funds rules, which departs from Brunsson and Olsen’s findings, 
finds several stages of implementation, which range from at first, isolating the changed rules, to, at a 
second stage, either merging of the parallel structures or reinforced isolation of the formal rules from the 
actual policy practice.  
 These are major questions from the implementation literature, which have so far received less 
attention than transposition2 and should be examined at the next stages of CEE implementation and 
Europeanization research. The theoretical puzzle defining the focus of this paper is the existence of 
different outcomes from the adoption of one and the same formal European policy – sometimes the 
adoption of formal policy leads to changes also in the informal policy, which is applied in practice, 
whereas in other cases, changes in formal policy remain just ‘law on the books’ and different informal 
policy is applied.  
 The situation of the new(er)3 EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), is 
particularly interesting in terms of the age-old problem of the gap between formal policy and actual 
implementation. First, because of the communist legacy of making laws without applying them in 
practice – known in the law literature as legal nihilism4. Second, because of the speedy and broad 
adaptation to the EU during pre-accession. It has been widely accepted that the Eastern enlargement of 
                                                        
2  See again the overview by Toshkov et al. (2010) and the database of qualitative studies at the Institute 
for European Integration Research at the Austrian Academy of Sciences. 
3 As the 2004-2007 eastern enlargement of the EU is now in the past, member states from Central and 
Eastern Europe rightly object to the label, ‘new member states’ which is used here only for convenience. 
4  This problem has been, of course, much more acute in Russia and former USSR states. 
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the EU involved the most extensive adaptation and stringent criteria for accession ever.5 Driven by 
conditionality, the candidates from CEE and Cyprus and Malta adopted the body of EU rules and 
regulations quite successfully, demonstrating, in some cases already before accession, a lower deficit of 
adoption of EU directives than many of the older member states. A major question, however, remains, 
namely ‘How are EU rules implemented in practice in the new member states’? This question arises in 
the ongoing debates of researchers and practitioners on the ‘real’ extent to which new member states from 
Central and Eastern Europe have adapted their policies to comply with the acquis communautaire.  
 This paper aims to address this question by first, proposing a general model of implementation as an 
interplay of formal and informal policy rules and second, applying this model to the case of the 
transposition and implementation of a directive on the return of cultural goods6 and a regulation on the 
export of cultural goods7 in Bulgaria. We follow transposition and implementation8 in Bulgaria in the 
period 2005-2009, a couple of years before and after accession to the EU. As mentioned above, we chose 
Bulgaria as it can be seen as a crucial case, which offers, in methodological terms, a valuable test as it is 
expected to strongly confirm or disconfirm prior hypotheses (McKeown, 2004: 141). In our case, 
Bulgaria’s implementation can serve to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis9 that high levels of formal 
                                                        
5 The well known Copenhagen criteria, specifying demands for the existence of market economy, 
democracy and the rule of law and adoption of the EU acquis. 
6 Directive 93/7/EEC of the Council of 15 March 1993 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully 
removed from the territory of a Member State (OJ No L 74 of 27.3.1993), modified by Directive No 
96/100/EC of 17.2.1996 (OJ No L 60 of 1.3.1996) and by Directive No 2001/38 of 5.6.2001 (OJ No L 
187 of 10.7.2001). 
7 Regulation (EEC) No 3911/92 of the Council of 9 December 1992 on the export of cultural goods (OJ 
No L 395 of 31.12.1992), modified by Regulation (EC) No 2469/96 of 16 December 1996 (OJ No L 335 
of 24.12.1996), by Regulation (EC) No 974/2001 of 14 May 2001 (OJ No L 137 of 19.5.2001), and by 
Regulation (EC) No 806/2003 of 14 April 2003 (OJ No L 122, 16.5.2003). Recently, this regulation and 
its amendments are codified by Council Regulation (EC) No 116/2009 of 18 December 2008 on the 
export of cultural goods (OJ No L 39 of 10.2.2009). For its implementation, Commission Regulation No 
752/93 of 9 December 1992 applies (OJ No L 77 of 31.3.1993), modified by Regulation (EC) No 1526/98 
of 16 July 1998 (OJ No L 201 of 17.7.1998) and Regulation (EC) No 656/2004 of 7 April 2004 (OJ No L 
104 of 8.4.2004). 
8 EC regulations have vertical and horizontal direct effect, however, since Bulgaria was still a candidate 
member in 2004/5, the export of cultural goods regulation needed to be incorporated in Bulgarian law.  
9 For a discussion of the possibility that new EU rules remain empty shells, see Dimitrova (2010). 
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compliance go hand in hand with actual disregard of implementation and enforcement in CEE states, 
resulting in a world of ‘dead letters’ (Falkner and Treib, 2008). The reason why Bulgaria is a crucial case 
is that its short record as EU member state contains evidence of a high level of adoption of formal EU 
rules with bad application of EU rules in certain areas. On the one hand, in mid-2008, Bulgaria was 
declared by the EU Commission, based on Bulgarian notification data, to have zero transposition deficit, 
in other words to have transferred all of the EU’s existing directives into national law. On the other hand, 
only a few weeks later, the country received one of the most critical monitoring reports in EU history, in 
which the European Commission invoked clauses allowing a freezing or stopping of funding on a number 
of pre-accession and post accession financing programmes due to suspicions of corruption, fraud and 
illegal practices.10 
 The choice of movable cultural heritage policy has been guided by other considerations. We selected 
this policy area as it has relatively few legislative measures and thus allows us to eliminate the possibility 
that other factors, such as issue linkages with other policies would make it more difficult to apply our 
model. In the process of researching the case study, we have nevertheless found that, for domestic policy 
makers, movable cultural heritage policy and its implications are much broader than the European policy. 
Although we have become well aware of the complexity of this area, we have found that most other 
issues in the Bulgarian policy debate can be disregarded when studying the implementation of the EU 
instruments, while keeping the essential elements of the process in the picture. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next part we present a framework explaining the variation in 
implementation based on the choices of implementing actors. In the second part of the paper we analyze 
the transposition and implementation of the return of cultural goods directive and cultural goods export 
                                                        
10 Serious problems with EU rules have been discovered in areas with distributive consequences, under 
the SAPARD and ISPA programmes and operational programmes on transport and regional development. 
An OLAF report from 2008 revealed cases of abuse of EU rules under SAPARD by a wide network of 
Bulgarian and other EU citizens, which led to the conviction of some of the persons involved by a 
German court. The Bulgarian members of the same group, which has been accused of abusing SAPARD 
funds are still under investigation but have not yet been convicted. 
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regulation. For this in-depth implementation case study we combine interviews with documentary 
evidence, legislative sources and media reports, and with testing out the informal rules ‘on the ground’. 
This ‘active’ form of participant observation adds a new dimension to process tracing in methodological 
terms as it allows us to compare interview and documentary data with the actual workings of the policy 
for those for whom it is intended. In the next section, we trace transposition and implementation and 
highlight different outcomes in policy implementation and show how the mechanisms suggested in the 
theoretical framework account for this outcome. We also draw some tentative conclusions as to the 
theoretical and practical implications of our analysis. 
2.   Implementation of European policy  
The ever-growing body of literature on EU legislation and the member states is rich with a variety of 
explanations why a country may be delayed in transposing EU legislation. Implementation proper, 
however, has rarely been studied, mostly because it does not lend itself to large-scale comparative 
research. Jacques Ziller, co-author of one of the earliest studies of transposition and implementation in the 
EU (Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988), has rightly noted that most research in compliance in the EU has been 
biased towards transposition research and little work has been done on actual implementation. 
Mastenbroek’s (2005) thoughtful overview of this literature, which confirms this assessment, while 
Toshkov et al. (2010) quantify it by telling us that only 19 per cent of studies deal with implementation as 
opposed to transposition. This paper has therefore focused on a single country case, which is explored in 
depth. Despite this narrow focus, we first aim to present a model and an explanation that are both 
theoretically driven and rooted in existing insights from transposition and implementation research. In the 
following paragraphs, we examine some of the most relevant studies and suggest how our proposed 
framework builds on their findings. 
 Implementation studies in a broader sense have tended to choose between two kinds of theoretical 
explanations, those rooted in political factors and those focusing on administrative issues and capacity. In 
the international relations literature, Tallberg’s (2002) much cited article on paths to compliance has 
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defined this division of the compliance literature and summarized the main elements of the two main 
approaches. According to him, IR studies of compliance by states are broadly divided between 
enforcement and compliance approaches. The variables central for the enforcement approach are 
described by Tallberg as incentives and sanctions, both determining whether states would shirk or comply 
with already signed international agreements (2002: 612). By contrast, the management approach 
suggests that states want to comply with agreements they have signed, but are hindered by rule ambiguity 
and capacity limitations (2002: 613).  
 Making the connection with research into EU rule adoption by CEE states during the pre-accession 
period, we can immediately see that the ‘enforcement’ model is the closest relative of the ‘external 
incentives model’, which was quite successful in explaining compliance of CEE states with EU formal 
rules (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). By contrast, a large chunk of the public administration 
literature which aimed to diagnose the deficiencies of the political and administrative systems of the post 
communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe focused on capacity issues (see, for instance, 
Verheijen, 2000). It was, in fact, the approach adopted by the European Commission, which stressed 
administrative capacity as one of the key areas to be improved if the candidates were to become well 
functioning members of the EU. Throughout the years of pre-accession preparation, this concern with 
administrative capacity was translated, among others, in institutional investment in developing systems 
for coordinating EU policy making within the CEE administrations (Dimitrova and Toshkov, 2007). 
 In a similar vein, a large scale analysis of pre-accession compliance of CEE states by Hille and Knill 
(2006) came to the conclusion that the quality of the administrations of CEE states was the main factor 
for their progress towards fulfilling pre-accession criteria. In-depth research of Poland’s enlargement 
preparations by Zubek (2005, 2008), on the other hand, stressed both institutional capacity and political 
coordination were crucial for good transposition.  
 Research into compliance by CEE member states beyond implementation is growing, but is still a 
domain inhabited by a relatively small group of scholars (Toshkov et al. 2010; Sedelmeier, 2008, 2009; 
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Toshkov, 2008, 2009; Falkner and Treib, 2008). Two important comparative studies of implementation in 
CEE highlighted the interplay of administrative and political factors for successful transposition. The 
work by Toshkov (2008, 2009) combines large-scale transposition research with case studies looking into 
transposition in a number of the new member states. He showed the importance of both political factors 
and administrative capacity for the successful transposition of EU directives. The study of social policy 
directives by Falkner and Treib (2008) includes both transposition and implementation. Based on their 
findings in the social policy field, Falkner and Treib suggest that CEE states belong to a ‘world of dead 
letters’ characterized by a ‘pattern of politicized transposition and shortcomings in enforcement and 
application’ (2008: 308). Their findings (2008: 304-5) also underlined the importance of enforcement 
bodies and their administrative capacity. 
 That both administrative and political factors will matter for implementation is in itself an important, 
although not a surprising conclusion. But what kind of interplay and hierarchy can we expect between 
political and administrative actors in the process of implementing EU policies? After all, it is quite logical 
to expect that different actors would matter at the transposition and implementation stages of the overall 
process of implementation. 
3. Implementation between multiple actors, interests and discretionary space 
Building on previous work (Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2000), we propose an actor oriented model, 
which starts from the choices of key players such as the enforcing European players and domestic veto 
players. We suggest the process of transposition and implementation is defined in turn by both national 
political and administrative actors as well as the European Commission.  
 In our argument we define a policy as a set of (formal and informal) rules and practices aiming to 
achieve a certain objective with regard to a particular issue or a sector, then the formal policy is defined 
by (primary and secondary) legislation and is enforceable by third parties. The informal policy consists of 
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the rules that are used in practice and the way actors actually apply them.11 We define implementation of 
EU policies as a process with several stages, the first of which, in the case of directives, is transposition – 
the adoption of a directive in national legislation. We define implementation proper as a second stage 
whereby policies are adjusted (if necessary) so that the informal policy or practices fit the adopted formal 
policies. Implementation, in this definition, involves a set of activities by administrative actors to ensure 
application of the policies formally agreed to (see also Siedentopf and Ziller, 1988). Further enforcement 
in the form of sanctions is a possible third stage, which may or may not follow, depending on how well 
the states have complied with the new legislation.12 
 Our interest is, however, now focused on the informal policy that will emerge on the ground and the 
role of the implementing actors – administrative actors, which shape the practices on the ground. These 
are mid-level state officials and civil servants who, similarly to veto players, are in an organizational 
position which makes them key figures for the implementation of a policy.13 It is also important to note 
that as Dimitrova (2010) has argued, in the post communist context, some veto players may exist that 
may not have a formal position in the political system, but still play a role in decision making. We take 
such informal veto players into account.  
 A first element in our argument is to focus on the preferences of players at various levels. These 
include the overseeing Commission, the national veto players involved with the making of a legislative 
policy and the administrative actor who has responsibility for the implementation of the policy. 
Preference heterogeneity has an important impact on the extent to which players have an incentive to 
deviate from the European policy. If players share similar views on a matter, there will be not much of a 
discussion on how a policy will be implemented.                                                          
11 In this paper, we use the terms informal policy and policy practice interchangeably.  
12 We use a division similar to Versluis (2007: 59) in defining these stages, however that we take a 
slightly different interpretation of implementation by stressing the adjustment of informal rules in a 
policy area to fit the adopted formal rules. We use the term compliance synonymously with 
implementation. 
13 We do not include in this analysis Lipsky’s street level bureaucrats, although clearly they also have 
discretion in implementation. Our focus is a level higher. 
 9 
 Secondly, we assume that by delegating the implementation of a policy to a lower-level player—we 
call this the implementor—the delegating veto players will be faced with discretion. Steunenberg (2006) 
discusses the role of players at different levels in the transposition process and argues that differences in 
views among these players have an impact on the outcome. The structure of the decision making process 
provides lower-level players with the possibility to make decisions that are not fully shared by the 
overseeing, higher-level players. The reason for this is that in making a collective decision against the 
implementor’s choice, the higher-level players need to agree to change the implementor’s policy. If there 
are several higher-level players, they may not be able to agree on a common action.  
 We label the implementor’s policy the informal policy. The higher-level players in the domestic 
arena—the domestic policy makers—may adopt another policy, which is called the formal policy. This 
policy could be the result of a national legislative process. The preferences of the domestic veto players 
define the unanimity set, that is, a set of points for which any further change is objected by at least one of 
the players. The implementor may prefer an informal policy within or outside this unanimity set. If 
outside, the domestic veto players are able to force the implementor to change its informal policy in the 
formal policy that is the result of agreement among the veto players. If the implementor prefers an 
informal policy within this set, the domestic veto players are not able to change it. In that case, the 
implementor’s policy will stand.  
 We expect the implementation of a policy to be the result of the interactions between players at three 
distinct levels, that is, on the European, national and operational level. A first finding is that undisputed 
and straightforward implementation of the European policy is rather rare. It will only occur when the 
implementor prefers this policy and, given the location of the unanimity set, is able to choose it without 
any legislative reversal:  
Hypothesis 1 (incidental compliance): When the European policy is located in the domestic 
unanimity set and coincides with the domestic implementor’s preferences, there will be no 
implementation gap between the European policy and the informal domestic policy. 
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This means that in most instances one cannot expect that the European policy will be implemented very 
precisely at the informal level. The corollary of this hypothesis is that if the European policy is not in the 
domestic unanimity set and the implementor’s ideal position is not equal to the European policy, there 
will be an implementation gap between the European and the domestic policy. In other words, differences 
between the policy-as-agreed and the policy-as-implemented are more likely than full compliance. 
 Our proposed framework includes the Commission as an enforcer—an external agency with a certain 
capacity to impose the European policy on the domestic actors.14 Furthermore, we suggest that the 
Commission has policy preferences but that these preferences are closely related to the adopted policy. 
This assumption is fairly realistic given the Commission’s agenda setting role in EU decision making and 
especially its crucial role in enlargement. It is worth pointing out that with regard to the new member 
states, the Commission has been a powerful actor giving detailed suggestions for specific policy changes 
and solutions and monitoring implementation. Accounts by participants in the CEE accession 
negotiations have stressed the inclination of the Commission to propose policy solutions even when the 
EU legislative measures were broad and open to interpretation.15 
 We regard the level of enforcement as a mixture of costs and benefits. On the one hand, the 
Commission faces transaction costs, which are a function of possible ambiguities in the interpretation of 
European law, information asymmetries, or capacity limitations. On the other hand, the Commission 
prefers enforcing some policies more than others, which is result of the salience of a policy and whether 
the Commission prefers some ‘drift’ during implementation (Steunenberg, 2010). Distinguishing costs 
and benefits implies that the Commission will not challenge every deviation from a European policy, but 
                                                        
14 At the enforcement stage, the Commission may involve other actors such as the European Court of 
Justice, to achieve compliance. These interactions can be analyzed further (for instance, Steunenberg 
2010), but since we focus here on the domestic implementation process, we disregard them.  
15  According to Maniokas (2005:54), the Commission “…managed to almost monopolize relations with 
the candidate countries by assigning priorities to their governments, which oftentimes went beyond the 
acquis…” He stresses that the Commission’s preferences were dominant most of the time, even though 
other negotiators pointed out that when member states had specific negotiation issues which they felt 
strongly about they pushed the Commission to adopt certain positions (Telicka and Bartak, 2007:150). 
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only those deviations for which enforcement contains net-benefits. Secondly, the Commission will select 
such a level of enforcement and thus prosecute deviations from the European policy up to the point where 
marginal costs equal marginal benefits. We will summarize the resulting levels of enforcement as ‘strong’ 
versus ‘weak’. With strong enforcement we mean a situation where the Commission constraints the 
choice of a domestic policy; in case of weak enforcement the domestic actors do not feel this restriction. 
 When the European policy is located outside the domestic unanimity set, the domestic veto players 
have an incentive to shift this policy towards a more preferred, domestic one. Whether they are able to 
adopt a deviating domestic policy and whether the implementor will subsequently implement this policy 
depends on the degree of enforcement. In case of strong enforcement, the Commission matters because 
domestic players will be constrained in their choice. The scale of the shift partly depends on the 
enforcer’s calculus. Still, both the domestic veto players and the implementor are constrained by the 
Commission in making their choices. They therefore cannot choose their most preferred policy. In case of 
the domestic veto players this means that the policy allowed by the Commission is outside the unanimity 
set. As a consequence, the implementor does not have an opportunity to shift the policy during the 
implementation process. Commission monitoring but also national oversight precludes this. We therefore 
expect: 
Hypothesis 2 (domestic adaptation): When the European policy is not located in the domestic 
unanimity set and European enforcement is strong, we can expect the formal policy to deviate from 
the European policy and to be the same as the informal policy. 
 
 The range of domestic responses is rather different when the European policy is located within the 
unanimity set. Domestic veto players will not be able to change the European policy and will opt for a 
literal transposition of the directive (Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2000). If the implementor shifts the 
informal policy outside this set, in case it has different preferences than the domestic veto players, the 
veto players will respond by reversing this policy towards a more commonly accepted formal policy 
within the unanimity set. Within the domestic unanimity set, however, the implementor may shift the 
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policy due to the inertia of the domestic veto players. This shift is conditional on the strength of 
enforcement from the European Commission. We therefore expect: 
Hypothesis 3a (parallel policies): When the European policy is located in the domestic unanimity set 
and does not coincide with the implementor’s preferences, there will be deviation in the informal 
policy from the formal and the European policy. This deviation is conditional on the strength of 
enforcement. 
 
Only in the case of strong enforcement, the differences between formal and informal policy would be 
small, minor deviations from the European policy, which are common in implementation. We note that in 
a different configuration, which we will address in one of the following hypotheses, a situation of parallel 
policies may also occur.  
 Finally, when the European policy is not in the domestic unanimity set, but Commission enforcement 
is weak, the outcome of the domestic implementation game can again be affected by inertia. Although the 
domestic veto players will adopt a deviating formal policy, the implementor may prefer another policy 
than the formal one. As long as the informal policy remains in the unanimity set, the domestic policy 
makers will be divided over the policy and unable to stop implementation.  
Hypothesis 3b (parallel policies): When the European policy is not located in the domestic unanimity 
set and European enforcement is weak, we can expect the informal policy to deviate from the 
European policy and to differ also from the formal policy.16 
 
 The main consequence hypotheses 3a and 3b is, is that ‘parallel policy universes’ develop in which the 
domestic policy makers may claim that the European policy is properly transposed and legally 
implemented, but the domestic implementor, following its own preferences, works on the basis of a 
different informal policy, inspired by different ideas. These could be the domestic status quo ex ante, 
which was replaced by the European policy, or existing policy ideas from the policy sector, which were 
not incorporated in the European policy. 
                                                        
16  This is only true if the implementor does not prefer the formal policy. If the implementor’s preferences 
coincide with the formal policy, we have another case of domestic adaptation. 
 13 
4.  Legislating and implementing EU rules on movable cultural heritage in Bulgaria: multiple 
implementation practices 
As mentioned above, the case of Bulgaria is critical for testing explanations of the relationship between 
formal and informal policy implementation due to the discrepancies between the country’s excellent 
record in transposition and some existing evidence of deviation in informal policy practices. In order to 
establish the formal rules and informal practices of implementation, this part of the paper provides an 
overview of the transposition and implementation of the two EU measures and discusses the informal 
policy practice.  
 The commitment to adapt Bulgaria’s existing legislation on cultural monuments were part of the 
negotiations of the Customs Union chapter, which included the EU acquis in the area of moveable 
cultural heritage. First, Bulgaria had to bring its policy in line with the Union’s cultural goods export 
regulation17, which sets rules on the export of ‘cultural goods’18 to countries outside the EU. According to 
the regulation, depending on the age and monetary value of a specific type of cultural good, export is only 
possible with a community license. An example of such a good is a painting of more than 50 years old 
with a value of more than 150.000 Euro. Second, Bulgaria had to transpose the return of cultural goods 
directive according to which member states need to guarantee the return of goods that may have been 
unlawfully taken from the territory of another member state. This policy concerns national treasures that 
fit within the categories defined in the preceding regulation.19 In order to implement this policy, Bulgaria                                                         
17 It is also worth noting that as part of the EU assistance in implementing the acquis in the area of 
movable cultural heritage, a Dutch Bulgarian project was set up to assist the ministry of culture and 
stimulate debate on the nature of the policy (Strengthening the institutions and administrative capacity of 
the Bulgarian Ministry of Culture and Tourism for full application of the acquis communautaire related 
to cultural heritage). This can be seen as an informal channel of Europeanisation that aimed to support 
lesson drawing from other EU member states and societal debate. The most important incentive for policy 
change, however, seems to have been, as always, EU pre-accession conditionality. 
18 In the context of Regulation 3911/92 and later Regulation 116/2009 the term ‘cultural object’ or 
‘good’ refers to an object fitting to one of the categories listed in the Annex of this regulation.  
19 Directive 93/7/EEC focuses on a more narrowly defined set of cultural goods, since it defines a 
‘cultural object’ or ‘good’ as “…national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value and 
belongs to one of the categories listed in the Annex or does not belong to one of these categories but 
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had to define which goods are national treasures and to register these so that in case of unlawful removal 
a request of return could be made. In both pieces of legislation, the European policy explicitly allows 
member states to make their own decision which objects constitute national treasures and, if they wish, to 
implement a more restrictive export regime also for categories that are not part of European law. 
 Examining the implementation of EC law requires a quick look back at the policy status quo before 
Bulgaria started harmonizing its legislation with the Union as a result of the accession negotiations.20 The 
legislation which shaped the policy status quo dates back to the communist period. In the past, Bulgaria 
has had a rather restrictive regime requiring a license for the export of cultural goods. This situation did 
not change much when Bulgaria started accession negotiations. The initial adaptation of the old policy did 
not change the policy’s restrictive character and was quite minimal and incremental. 
  The first legal changes necessary for the transposition of the directive and the implementation of the 
regulation were introduced with an amendment of the Law on Cultural Monuments and Musea from 
196921 and two decrees. One decree specifies a procedure for valuation of declared cultural goods22, while 
the other specifies the procedures for the export and temporary export of cultural goods.23 This could be 
described as ‘quick and dirty’ transposition, given that the original law on Cultural Monuments and 
Musea dated from 1969 and reflected completely different societal relations and the notions of private 
property typical for the communist state. Even simply due to its age, the law was outdated and had 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
forms an integral part of …public collections …or the inventories of ecclesiastical institutions” (see 
Article 1). 
20 For a timeline of events and most important legislation, please see the Appendix. 
21 This law was initially passed in 1969 (State Gazette no 29, 11 April 1969). The Bulgarian translation 
uses the term ‘cultural monuments’, which seems to equal to ‘national treasures’ in the European 
terminology. In this paper we prefer the latter term as it is used in the EU documents. 
22 Decree No. 1 of 28 January 2005 on the procedure for the evaluation of declared cultural goods owned 
by legal entities and individuals issued by the Ministry of Culture, published in the State Gazette no 13 of 
8 February 2005, amended, State Gazette, no 33, of 15 April 2005 (Original title: “Naredba no 1 ot 28 
january 2005 za reda za izvurshvane na ocenka na deklarirani dvizhimi pametnici na kulturata, 
sobstvenost na juridicheski I fizicheski lica”). 
23 Decree on the export and temporary export of cultural goods issued by the Ministry of Culture, 
published in the State Gazette, no 96, of 24 October 2004, amended State Gazette no 51, 21 June 2005 
(Original title: “Naredba za iznos I vremenen iznos na dvizhimi pametnici na kulturata”). 
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already undergone a very high number of amendments, seventeen from the time of adoption till 2005 
when an amendment was made with the aim to transpose the European directive. 
 Bulgaria was somewhat delayed in complying with the obligations to comply with EU legislation in 
the movable cultural heritage field undertaken in the Customs Union negotiation chapter. The 
Commission had already launched formal infringement proceedings against Bulgaria which were 
discontinued when an amendment in 2005 was passed.24 The motivation attached to the 2005 amendment 
mentions specifically the necessity to comply with the export regulation on cultural goods (Motives, 
2005). The motivation of the amendment stated that the implementation of the regulation was in 
accordance with the obligations undertaken by the Bulgarian government in the EU accession 
negotiations under negotiation Chapter 25, Customs Union. One of the main tasks of the amendment was 
to introduce the categories of cultural goods requiring a community license as prescribed by the export 
regulation. The categories of goods as well as their value thresholds for this permission regime were 
defined in an annex of this law. For other cultural goods that were not defined as national treasures and 
did not fall under one of these categories, the law allowed export, but only with a certificate issued by the 
Director of the National Centre for Museums, Galleries and Fine Arts. The 2005 amendment also 
proposed a single unified register of national treasures to facilitate their return to Bulgaria if they have 
been unlawfully exported to another EU member state. 
 As for the character of the policy under the amended legislation, it still put an emphasis on identifying 
one kind of cultural good, ‘national treasures’. More specifically, ‘national treasures’ were defined in 
Bulgarian law as goods of “… scientific and /or cultural value” that have “public importance”.25 Based on 
our interviews, we have the impression that this definition provides little guidance to the implementors of 
Bulgaria’s movable cultural heritage policy. There are a variety of interpretations. A point of view shared 
                                                        
24 The third Commission report (2009: 4) on the application of Directive 93/7/EEC notes that Malta, 
Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria were late with transposing the directive before the deadline set in their 
accession negotiations and therefore infringement proceedings were launched. 
25 See Article 3 of the Law on Cultural Monuments and Museums. 
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by a large part of the expert community, for example, defines any object part of an existing museum 
collection is a ‘national treasure’ resulting in a situation where thousands of objects fall under a very 
restrictive export regime. Moreover, this view seems to inform the assessments of privately owned 
objects. Goods that are defined and registered as ‘national treasures’ cannot be permanently exported. 
 The specific position of Bulgaria as a country that was not yet member of the EU but was preparing 
for accession was reflected in the introduction of a pre-accession transitional period. The Decree no 1 and 
the annex to the amended 1969 law divided the period between 2005, the time of amendment adoption 
and the expected date of full EU membership of Bulgaria, 2007, into three stages: in 2005, in 2006 and 
after Bulgaria’s accession to the EU, thus introducing a form of transitional arrangement. The three stages 
allowed the export of cultural goods with different, progressively rising values: The values of objects 
permitted for export were, for example: paintings and drawings could be exported if their value is less 
than 100,000 BGL26 in 2005, in 2006 they could be exported if they were valued lower than 200,000 BGL 
and after full membership this threshold was raised to 300,000 BGL. 
 This transitional arrangement was meant to achieve full compliance with the monetary values 
specified in the cultural goods export regulation by the time of accession. Thus, after 2007, the values of 
cultural goods subject to export restrictions would become considerably higher than previously defined. It 
must be noted that already in 2005, the implementation of these provisions could have been foreseen as 
problematic, due to the underdeveloped market in Bulgaria for cultural goods and the very restrictive 
provisions of the original 1969 law. The decree and the amendment of the law, however, can be said to 
formally transpose the EU measures in the area of movable cultural heritage in a reasonably correct way. 
Following this legal change, however, the discussion of the amendment of this old legislation triggered, 
only a few months later, a second stage of bargaining between relevant actors as a result of which, some 
years later, in 2009, a completely new law has been adopted.                                                          
26 BGL is Bulgarian Leva. At the time of writing, 1 euro equals approximately 1,95 BGL. The annex of 
the Regulation defines this value as 150,000 euro, thus the amounts are roughly the same in the Decree 
and the European regulation. 
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 The analysis of the implementing measures so far shows that the Bulgarian government and the 
Minister of Culture had taken sufficient measures to live up to the obligations under negotiation chapter 
25, Customs Union and introduce the provisions regulating the export and temporary export of cultural 
goods. The next question, however, is whether the actual policies on the ground were affected by the 
formal change of legislation. 
 The main implementing bodies were committees of experts appointed by the general Museums 
Directorate. A specific expert evaluation committee is appointed by the director of a national or regional 
museum. Several different expert committees may be appointed depending on the type of artifacts 
citizens formally need to register and may want to export – e.g. paintings, archaeological artifacts, 
ethnographical artifacts and others. These committees have the task to register and assess the quality of 
objects, even if these objects are later rejected as ‘cultural’ goods. Based on a legally defined form, their 
conclusion is limited to four categories: an object can be (1) a national treasure, (2) a cultural good 
belonging to one of the categories defined by the export regulation, (3) a cultural good that does not 
belong to these categories, or (4) has no qualities of a cultural good. Based on the committee’s 
assessment, objects classified as national treasures should be included in a nation-wide register.27 The 
classification affects the possibilities for export. Objects in categories (4) and (3) can be exported, 
although goods of category (3) require an export certificate.28 Goods in category (2) are subject to 
permission and require a community license, while national treasures (1) may only be temporarily 
exported.  
 When the implementation of the policy was tested by the researchers in January 2008, a year after 
Bulgaria’s accession to the European Union, it was discovered that one of the main expert committees 
attached to the National Gallery of Fine Arts was proceeding with its work in the exact same way as they 
                                                        
27 It is not clear to us whether, at the time of writing, such a register has been created. 
28 The Decree on the export and temporary export of cultural goods links the export of goods to their 
registration, since it requires the expert evaluation as part of the registration procedure as one of the 
documents for the application of an export license or certificate.  
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did before the 2005 amendment. The previously existing informal policy, reinforcing and complementing 
the provisions of the law of 1969, guided the expert committee(s) to value paintings according to their 
author, using an extensive list of major artists in Bulgaria for the last couple of centuries. All works of 
these authors were automatically considered as national treasures and thus their export was not allowed.29 
Works of other authors that were not on this list were evaluated as having ‘no qualities as a cultural good’ 
and could be exported. This policy empowered the museum expert evaluation committee to determine 
whether or not an object could be seen as belonging to the national cultural heritage and whether it was, 
in the meaning of the 1969 law, of legitimate public interest. Furthermore, this informal policy, which 
was, before 2005, complementing the previous formal policy enshrined in the 1969 legislation, bore all 
the marks of a political system in which private property in general and property and trade in cultural 
goods in particular, could not officially exist.  
 It is clear that up to 2005, when the 1969 law was amended to take into account European policy, there 
could not be much of an open market in cultural artifacts in and outside Bulgaria due to this law and the 
informal policy attached to it. At the same time, numerous newspaper articles testify to the fact that, in 
the late 1990s, a thriving black market trading in ancient (for example Roman, Greek, Thracian) artifacts 
developed which was meant for export of such goods from Bulgaria to collectors abroad. This was a 
situation typical of the transition period when old legislation was not enforced due by the weak post 
communist state. It also illustrated the fact that the restrictive law and policy were not a barrier for illegal 
exports and a variety of informal practices which contravened official policy. 
 The implementation of the European directive and regulation was thus made more difficult in practice, 
due to the fact that the official market was quite underdeveloped. Market values would depend on the 
internal trade of only a few auction houses and galleries and would not be obvious to the experts. Thus, 
when confronted with the specific threshold amounts determining whether a community license or a                                                         
29 According to one interviewed expert, this so-called restrictive list system was a product of the power 
relations between communist officials and artists under the previous regime, the latter acting as patrons 
for the former and allowing them to sell or export their work only under very restrictive conditions. 
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certificate is required, the implementing actors such as the above mentioned committee of experts were at 
a loss. For example, in the category of 19-20 century paintings, the market value, in 2005-2007 of very 
few, if any works of art would exceed the amounts specified the export regulation. Therefore, a more 
differentiated approach in which only some outstanding work of a given author would be classified as 
‘national heritage’ while other, less significant works would be labeled as cultural goods might have 
resulted in an easy export of the latter based on a certificate that has to be granted by the minister based 
on the opinion of the evaluating committee.  
 The expert committee under the National Gallery for Fine Arts, however, did not make any references 
to the threshold amounts specified in the new legislation. The committee restricted itself to deciding on 
the one question, namely whether an object would be considered a ‘national treasure’ or whether it had no 
qualities as a cultural good at all (categories 1 and 4). Another expert committee convened under the same 
legislation, by the same Museum directorate, dealing with ethnographic objects and artifacts followed a 
similar path of limiting its evaluation on whether or not an object is a cultural good. If so, the object 
would be labeled as a ‘national treasure’. The main difference with the committee on fine arts was that 
the committee did not use a well-specified ‘list’ that would classify some categories of objects 
automatically as ‘not exportable’. In that respect, the informal policy was more in line with the new 
formal policy. Still, the idea that there are cultural goods which are not national treasures seems to be 
highly problematic in the Bulgarian context. As a consequence, the protection provided by the European 
policy may not yet be fully effective, since the inability to discriminate between important and 
unimportant national cultural objects slows down their registration and thus their possible return in case 
of unlawful export.  
 The story of transposition and implementation of these two rather small in scope EU measures could 
have ended here, but in fact, the changes of legislation were considered insufficient by Bulgarian political 
elites. There were elements in the amended law which opened up broad political and societal debate and 
triggered a new, extensive round of amendments and law making about the exact shape of the movable 
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cultural heritage policy.30 Clearly, the amending legislation of 2005 touched upon several areas of very 
high political salience for Bulgaria and possibly for many other post communist states: the acquisition 
and ownership of cultural artifacts, the definition of national cultural heritage, and the definition of 
private property. In the period 2005-2008, a vigorous debate followed and there were several attempts to 
adopt brand new legislation in this area which would also affect the policies covered in the EU 
legislation.31 The process of adapting to EU policies, although formally completed, provided an opening 
for a new round of bargaining on a completely new draft law on cultural heritage. 
 After prolonged and polarized debates in the National Assembly and in especially in the Standing 
Committee for Culture that prepared the drafts, finally a new law was adopted in March 2009 and came 
into force in April 2009.32 The new law includes stricter registration requirements and the need to 
demonstrate proof of legal ownership of objects. Moreover, for national treasures/specific cultural goods 
the law introduces the concept of ‘holder’ that replaces private ownership. Immediately after being passed 
the law was challenged in front of the Constitutional Court by the Ombudsman, who claimed that several 
articles and key concepts were potentially incompatible with the Constitutional guarantee of private 
property.  
 At the same time, interviews with experts revealed that the new law was considered impossible to 
apply and unworkable for stake holders.33 All societal actors were affected by the uncertainty of the new 
provisions and the market was blocked. Auction houses stopped their auctions in fear of confiscation of                                                         
30  For some of these discussions, see the contributions to Afman and Knoop (2008). 
31 In 2008, the coalition government led by the Movement for Simon the Second presented a new 
cultural heritage draft in parliament, which it was forced to withdraw after a few months. The government 
press release suggested the draft was withdrawn for further work and elaboration in view of problems 
with cultural objects, which had been exported unlawfully but were not included in the law’s definitions 
(www.today.bg, consulted at 30 June 2008). 
32 Law on the Cultural Heritage, adopted on 26 February 2009, State Gazette no 19 of 13 March 2009, in 
force 10 April 2009, with the exception of Art 114, para 2 and art 126, which come into force from April 
2010. 
33 Among the cited problems were the very short period (3 months) in which everyone who possessed 
any cultural goods/ objects would need to register them with the musea, the very broad definition of such 
goods and objects that would include everything from a carved wooden spoon to ancient Greek coins or 
prehistoric finds. 
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paintings under the unclear and restrictive provisions of the 2009 law.34 According to an interviewed 
museum expert, the musea themselves had no capacity to register and evaluate all cultural goods that 
would potentially be subject to registration according to the new law of 2009.35 Thus, from the 
perspective of this paper, a new formal policy was put in place in 2009, but the informal policy was in 
complete deadlock. In this period, some museum committees, such as the fine arts one mentioned above, 
continued to act according to the old informal rules and apply restrictive regime for exports based on the 
same practices and formal policy of 1969. Other committees tried to apply the new law, but they suffered 
from a complete lack of clarity in application resulting from the delay in the issuing of secondary 
legislation such as decrees to flesh out the new provisions. Practically all stakeholders were highly 
dissatisfied. Thus it was no surprise that after the change of government in Bulgaria following the July 
2009 elections36, in August 2009, a working group of experts was convened to start working on changes 
in the newly adopted law. 
5. Implementation in the light of the hypotheses 
Explaining our case in terms of the hypotheses developed in this paper, we need to establish the 
preference configuration and the location of the status quo. This includes the preferences of the domestic 
policy makers versus the European cultural policy and the preference of the implementing player.  
 Preferences of the domestic policy makers. As mentioned above, the 2005 amendment of the 
Bulgarian cultural monuments law brought formal policy in line with the EU acquis. However, the new                                                         
34 For example, the Victoria Auction House, which organized regular auctions of 19-20th century art, 
cancelled its planned auctions as soon as the law was in force. Later, in 2010, an attempt to hold auctions 
again resulted in some arrests linked to claims that the auctioned art had not been registered properly. 
35 Since each item needs to be described, it may take at least 10 minutes to evaluate one item and register 
it. A medium-size shop with 2,500 items requires then about 52 working days, or one expert working for 
10 weeks. In addition, the shopkeeper needs to pay a fee of 3 BGL per item adding to a total of BGL 
7,500 (or about 3,850 euro). 
36 The July 2009 elections led to the fall of the triple coalition led by the Bulgarian Socialists that had 
passed the 2005 and 2009 laws. The elections were won by the GERB formation (Citizens for European 
development of Bulgaria), a new political party defining itself as center right, which formed a minority 
government with the support of small parties on the right. 
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formal policy provoked tremendous discussions among political parties and NGOs, as well as in the 
media. Statements made in these discussions, the minutes of parliamentary debates, media and expert 
interviews provide evidence of the preferences of key actors, which are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Preferences of key actors 
Preferences of actors: 
 
Coalition parties in power 
2005-2009: 
In favor of the old style 
restrictive policy, all 
cultural goods are national 
treasures 
In favor of a new policy, 
transposing EU law, but 
also essentially restrictive 
More liberal approach, 
supports market for 
cultural goods 
Socialists  
(KZB, Coalition for Bulgaria) 
Yes, mostly, all movable and 
immovable goods are 
national treasures37 but some 
were in favor of new policy38 
  
NDSV  
(National Movement for 
Simeon II) 
 Yes, for a new law to respond 
to new realities and also EU 
requirements (sponsored the 
law); required official 
documents of ownership for 
all cultural goods39 
 
DPS  
(Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms) 
 Declared support for the 2005 
law but split40 
 
Parties in opposition: 
UDF (Union of Democratic 
Forces) 
  
For new, but restrictive law41 
 
Main party in government 
from 2009: 
GERB 
   




Divided: new legislation recommended, but some argue for more restrictive laws, others argue 
for a more liberal approach which aims to give some space for market and private initiative 43 
Other stakeholders: 
NGOs linked to government 
(informal veto players) 
  Argued for open market, 
more liberal policy, against 
specific parts of the new law 
which restrict ownership 
without proof 
Other stakeholders:  
             The Orthodox Church 
  Argued for a less restrictive 
regime of registration of 
cultural objects and no 
official proof of origin 
                                                         
37 Based on press statements of member of parliament Merdzhanov from the Socialist party in internet 
press sources 3.1. 
38 The socialists have been split as evidenced by the fact that many MPs refused to vote for the new law 
(see sources 3.2). 
39 Based on official statement of the NDSV political council reported in the press source 2.4. 
40 Based on statement of Member of Parliament Chetin Kazak in the press, source 2.5. 
41 Based on statements during the public consultations on the 2009 law, documented in internet and press 
sources 2.1. 
42 Based on press statements of the Minister of Culture Rashidov, media sources 2.2 and 3.1. 
43 According to statements in mediapool.bg by archaeologists working at musea from Sofia University 
(sources 2.3). 
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 As the table shows, domestic players have rather different views on what Bulgarian national policy on 
movable cultural heritage should be. Some have a more liberal view aiming to stop illegal market in 
cultural goods by facilitating registration of cultural objects and accepting already existing collections, 
while others follow a more restrictive route which requires registration based on official document 
provided by the state of all cultural objects and counting a wide range of objects as ‘national treasures’. 
As a consequence, the domestic unanimity set is quite broad especially if we take into account that non-
governmental actors that enjoy powerful patronage relationships with state actors can act as informal veto 
players (Dimitrova, 2010). Some of the NGOs tried to influence the deliberations of the Standing 
Committee on Culture or public consultations on the 2005 and 2009 laws.44 The most active and visible 
NGOs most likely represent the so called ‘big collectors’45 linked with the former communists or are new 
oligarchs. 
 Preferences of the implementor. The preferences of implementing actors have been established directly 
by us in the process of trying out the policy as participant observers. There have been ample statements 
from both committees as to what the right policy is according to them. They reflect some of the 
preferences of political actors, but also expert opinions cited in the broader debate in the media which 
distinguishes one very powerful domestic discourse and another, much less prominent, slightly more 
liberal one. 
 The one discourse, associated with one of the committees, which we can label ‘the patriots’, asserted 
that the new law did not make sense. According to ‘the patriots’, market values could not be established 
for any classical works of art and working according to the amounts specified in the EC Regulation would 
mean valuable works would be exported abroad, or ‘lost’. Works of so called classical authors, included 
on the committee’s list, are declared as ‘national treasures’ irrespectively of their quality.  
                                                        
44 Some NGOs even developed their own website dedicated to lobbying against restrictive legislation. 
See Archea, at: http://archaeology.zonebg.com/index.htm. 
45 Including, for example, the former chief of Department Six of the former Political Police Service 
Dimiter Ivanov, now chairing Foundation ‘Arete Fol’ (media sources 3.2). 
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 This is the dominant view among the broader public, as becomes clear from a representative public 
opinion poll by Alfa Research taken in September-October 2009. To the question how movable 
monuments of culture should be kept, 54% of respondents answer, only in state musea. That owners may 
hold such goods but not sell them is the opinion of 11% of respondents. The option that anyone may own 
such goods is only supported by 3% while 32% have no opinion (B. Dimitrova, 2009). 
 The other group of implementors whom we can label ‘the new internationalists’, saw it as their task to 
subscribe to a new European policy which according to them was more adjusted to existing realities and 
fitted to a forward looking museum policy. This implementor, the committee under the auspices of the 
Ethnographic museum, has on the whole a more nuanced view and aims to implement the 2005 law and 
corresponding secondary legislation by evaluating the quality of each object and its value according to the 
EU regulation. However, this committee does not work with other categories of cultural goods than 
‘national treasures’ either.  
 Clearly, these different implementing actors, each responsible for a specific subfield, have different 
preferences with regard to the formal national policy. Compared to the European policy, both committees 
seem to share the policy notion that all ‘publicly interesting’ artifacts are cultural goods and therefore 
should be regarded as ‘national treasures’. 
 European enforcement. As evident from the case presented above, the Commission does monitor 
implementation (see the discussion on p. 15). However, after the 2005 amendment, the Commission 
stopped formal proceedings for infringement as it was satisfied with the amendent as formal policy 
implementing the European policy. We consider therefore European enforcement to be relatively weak. 
 Predicted versus actual policy. Due to the strong polarization of preferences46, the domestic unanimity 
set is broad, as the domestic players disagree on further elaborations of the European policy. The 
European policy falls within the domestic unanimity set, as hypothesis 3a predicts. Moreover, European 
                                                        
46  Especially concerning issues of definition of what is national heritage and cultural monuments in 
relation to property rights. 
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enforcement can be regarded as weak. Indeed, as predicted, the 2005 amendment of the Bulgarian law 
incorporated literally the regime of the European export regulation.  
 The informal policy, however, may differ from the formal one, depending on the implementing 
player’s preferences. As we found in our research, one of the implementors does not prefer the formal 
policy and applies another informal policy (hypothesis 3a). The committee of the National Gallery of Fine 
Arts indeed informally has been applying the older policy and disregarding the formal policy. By 
declaring the whole oeuvre of some authors to be ‘national treasure’, this informal policy not only 
‘coincides’ with the policy under communism, but also resonates with some of the most powerful 
sentiments expressed in public discussions on cultural policy. 
 The other implementor, the committee under the auspices of the Ethnographic museum, has 
preferences, which are closer to the European policy. It has aimed to implement the European rules well 
and even has been asking the Ministry of Culture for instructions on the implementation of the formal 
policy as embedded in Bulgarian law, including the 2009 amendment. Although having a different view 
than the expert committee on fine arts, the expert committee on ethnographic objects also applies an 
informal policy that deviates from the formal one, which is in line with our hypothesis 3a.  
 Thus, the two European measures were respectively transposed and implemented formally, but at the 
level of informal policy there is variation. We found that two different, parallel sets of rules exist, which 
corroborate our expectations: when domestic policy makers are in deadlock, the implementing policy is 
mainly shaped by the implementing actors. 
6.  Conclusions: from implementation to Europeanization 
This paper developed a model explaining the various outcomes of the implementation of a formal EU 
policy and applied this model to the implementation of movable cultural heritage policy in Bulgaria. By 
applying a structured analytical approach to an in-depth case study in the area of movable cultural 
heritage, we have gained a better understanding of the relationship between formal compliance with EU 
rules and policies and practices on the ground.  
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 The framework developed in this paper explains the differences between formal (adopted) and 
informal (implemented) national policy with the existence of different preferences between, on the one 
hand, European and national policy makers and on the other, national policymakers and the national 
implementing actors. Based on this framework, we also establish that national policymakers can 
informally allow a reversal of European policy to an earlier national policy if the EU policy is not located 
in the domestic unanimity set.  
 Another contribution of the paper is that, based on our model, we can define a whole set of specific 
outcomes with regard to formal and informal domestic policies. One of these outcomes, domestic inertia, 
allows parallel informal and formal policies to co-exist.  
 Further, by means of an extensive, in depth case study with elements of participant observation, we 
were able to establish the formal and informal policies for one case of EU policy adaptation. We found 
that implementing actors exist in ‘parallel policy universes’ and are able to apply different policies 
because of the divergence of the positions of domestic veto players that results in a very broad domestic 
unanimity set. In other words, the domestic polarization on the issue of cultural heritage in Bulgaria has 
created broad bureaucratic discretion for informal policies to be applied. With a law that reflects a very 
broad set of political preferences, implementing actors have a free hand to follow their own preferences. 
 Even with an implementing actor that aims to implement the European policy well, it has been unable 
to apply a distinction between ‘national treasures’ and other cultural goods, including those defined by the 
European export regulation. This leads to a very restrictive regime which burdens existing resources to 
identify, register and preserve cultural goods. The inability to select the ‘treasures’ out of all existing 
cultural objects creates an additional capacity problem in a field that has limited resources and thus 
reduces the effectiveness of the policy.  
 Therefore, we can add a new twist to the literature that claims that implementation is a matter of 
administrative capacity. Our case shows that the policy as currently applied in practice is also made 
ineffective by (administrative) capacity limitations, mostly of the musea, that need to register a huge 
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number of objects with limited personnel. This capacity limitation is in fact made worse by the 
interpretation of the implementing actors.  
 We note that the framework does not explain (nor does it aim to do so) where the different 
implementors’ positions come from. Our close empirical observation of this case, however, allows us to 
draw some conclusions which echo the insights of scholars who have noted that under conditions of 
uncertainty, players use ideas and norms as roadmaps to define their actions (Keohane and Goldstein, 
1993). Members of both committees (our implementors) have expressed strong normative views on the 
formal legal arrangements. The patriots’ discourse which we have commented upon earlier is highly 
dominant in Bulgarian media and policy circles. Many actors, from the broad public to the constitutional 
court have expressed their own notions what can be considered appropriate when it comes to cultural 
heritage. The EU regulations provided, in a sense, just an opening for this debate to unfold.  
 This brings us to our final insights from this implementation study. We have found that the kind of 
Europeanization that follows transposition and implementation is not a simple process of adapting to EU 
requirements. This second wave of Europeanization is a mobilization of domestic actors that attempt to 
renegotiate policy and change the status quo – a conclusions that echoes the findings of the second wave 
of Europeanization literature (for example, Héritier et al, 2001). In this respect, implementation and 




Appendix: Timeline of the changes in Bulgarian cultural heritage policy 
 
Linked to the implementation and transposition of the Directive on the return of cultural objects 
unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State and the Regulation on the export of cultural 
goods.  
 
1969    Law on Cultural Monuments and Musea adopted 
 
    Numerous amendments 
 
2004    Decree of the Minister of Culture on the export and temporary export of cultural 
goods, State Gazette no 96, amended 2005, State Gazette no 52, June 2005. 
2005    Adoption of amendment of the Law on Cultural Monuments and Musea containing 
references to the EU legislation, 1st measure for the transposition of Directive 93/7 
EEC. 
    ‘Decree no 1 of 28 January 2005 of the Minister of Culture on the procedure for 
the evaluation of declared cultural goods owned by legal entities or individuals’. 
2007    Debates in the Parliamentary Standing Committee on culture start on a draft law on 
Cultural heritage. 




February  Law on Cultural Heritage adopted, published State Gazette no. 19 of 13 March 
2009. 
April  Law on Cultural Heritage in force. 
July 29  Ombudsman submits Law for review to the Constitutional Court, asks about 
provisions of art 113, al. 1,2,3 and para 5, al 2 and 3 of the concluding provisions 
and their compatibility with the Constitution. 
August  A working group of experts is convened by the Ministry of Culture to discuss 
broad and substantial amendments to the new law. 
August 30  Amendment to two specific provisions of the Law on Cultural heritage submitted 
to Parliament by two GERB members of Parliament (Pavel Dimitrov and Daniela 
Petrova). 
September 29 The Constitutional Court decides: rejects the claim that the provisions of article 
113 are incompatible with articles 17, al 1 and 3 of the Bulgarian Constitution and 
declares the provisions of para 5, al 2 and 3 of the transitional and concluding 
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